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NOTES
mental injury as "great damage to the nerves" an inexact phrase, to say
the least. It is, like so many problems in the law, a question of drawing
the line. We are not helped by ancient dogmas or artificial distinctions.
And it is not enough even to reach desirable results and to make good de-
cisions. It is important that the reasons employed be sound and valid. It
has truly been said that in this noisy world we cannot insure the individual
absolute tranquillity. But should not this very difficulty prod us in the
struggle for the maximum obtainable level? Should it not lead the law to
use its exemplary effect to encourage greater respect for peace of mind?
The law in this area is in a state transition.4 3 The signs are unmistakable.
Recovery may be denied for mental anguish alone, but permitted for the
same injury as an element of damages once a technical tort is established.
Recovery may be denied when the injury is the result of negligence, but
permitted when it is intentionally inflicted. Recovery may be denied when
defendant and plaintiff occupy no special relationship, but permitted when
the defendant owes the plaintiff a high degree of care. Each of these incon-
sistencies, and others, may be rationalized, but none of them is rational.
They all point in one direction: toward the recognition of the emotions as
a part of the person which the law can and should protect from harmful and
unjustified invasion.
Science is charting new areas in its exploration of the -psyche; enlight-
ened society is moving forward with new awareness and concern. In the
meantime the law is proudly bringing up the rear, serving even while it
stands and waits. Gradually it too will move into the regions formerly un-
known. It is only a question of time.
WILLiAM B. GOLDFARB
Good Faith and the Right to Compensation
For Improvements on Land of Another
Originally at common law, a person was under no obligation to pay for
unauthorized improvements made upon his land.' One making improve-
ments without the owner's knowledge or consent was not entitled to com-
pensation, even though he acted in good faith, under a bona fide belief of
'"he treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs essentially
to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as para-
sitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is
merely a question of social, economic and industrial needs as those needs are reflected
in the organic law." 1 STREE, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LiAILiTy 470 (1906).
Measured by the change in social attitude and the progress of psychology, the fifty
years since the above statement was made constitute an epoch. If its author is cor-
rect, the "transitory stage" should by now have given way to the predicted recogni-
tion. The fact that it has not yet done so is attributable to legal lag.
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ownership. Under the civil law, and later in the equity courts, this harsh
rule was modified to allow compensation for improvements made in good
faith, by one in bona fide adverse possession of the land under color of
tide.2 This person will be referred to hereafter as the "occupant."
The strict common law rule was modified under two well known
equitable theories. One, the principle of unjust enrichment, and the other
the maxim of "he who seeks equity must do equity." These theories re-
sulted in the enactment of legislation in most jurisdictions allowing com-
pensation to the occupying claimant. The statutes are generally referred
to as "occupying claimant laws" or "betterment acts." Most of these statutes
require three concurrent essentials, as do the courts of equity, in order for
compensation to be granted: (1) the occupant must improve in good
faith; (2) he must be in adverse possession; and (3) he must have posses-
sion under color of title. This note is concerned only with the first of
these essentials, namely good faith.
NOTICE FROM RECORDS
There is a decided split of authority as to whether constructive notice,
from the records, of existence of a paramount tide or interest will deprive an
occupant of the right to be reimbursed for his improvements, upon being
ejected from the premises.3 Or in other words, does the fact of an adverse
record tide preclude an occupant from reimbursement for improvments
because he cannot be considered a possessor in good faith? The majority of
jurisdictions have held that constructive notice will not defeat the right of
the occupant to compensation; 4 that the occupant is nevertheless a posses-
sor in good faith. This rule is applied to recorded mortgages, as well as to
deeds.5
One test used by the courts is that of actual notice.6 The reasoning is
Buswell v. Hadfield, 202 Ark. 200, 149 S.W.2d 555 (1941); Rezeppa v. Seymour,
230 Mich. 439, 203 N.W. 62 (1925); Feenberg v. Tulsa Chamber of Commerce,
128 Okla. 134, 261 Pac. 950 (1927).
'Kester v. Bostwick, 153 Fla. 437, 15 So.2d 201 (1943); Harper v. Durdin, 177
Ga. 216, 170 S.E. 45 (1933).
8 See 68 A.L.R. 291 and 82 A.L.R. 921.
" States following the majority view are: Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
5Warwick v. Harvey, 158 Md. 457, 148 At. 592 (1930).
'Weatherly v. Purcell, 217 Ark. 908, 234 S.W.2d 32 (1950); Beard v. Dansby, 48
Ark. 183, 2 S.W. 701 (1886); Combs v. Deaton, 199 Ky. 477, 251 S.W. 638
(1923); Bragg v. McCoy, 188 Ky. 762, 224 S.W. 200 (1920); Warwick v. Harvey,
158 Md. 457, 148 Ad. 592 (1930); Brown v. Baldwin, 121 Mo. 106, 25 S.W. 858
(1893); Sequatchie Coal Co. v. Sunshine Coal and Coke Co. 25 Tenn. App. 604, 166
S.W.2d 402 (1942).
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that if constructive notice would defeat the right to compensation, the in-
stances would be very rare when the right could be invoked.7 Actual notice
is either knowledge of an outstanding paramount title, or of some circum-
stance from which the court or jury may fairly infer that the occupant had
cause to suspect the invalidity of -his own tide.8 If there was notice of some
fact or circumstance that would lead a man of ordinary prudence to such
an inquiry as would result in his actual notice, compensation is denied
Another test employed is that of honest belief.10 The occupant is in
good faith if he possesses under the honest belief in his right or title, and
the fact that diligence might have shown that he had no title does not
necessarily negative good faith." Where the occupant claims through a
quit claim deed, honest belief is sufficient for him to be in good faith.12
A minority of jurisdictions' 3 hold the occupant to be in bad faith if he
was on constructive notice of an adverse claim.14 Bad faith will preclude a
recovery for the improvements because good faith is a prerequisite. These
courts argue that the occupant should search the records and avail himself
of the means of knowledge open to him by such records; otherwise he is
not in good faith.' 5 Records are for public usage and knowledge, and one
who shuts his eyes to things which might have been discovered upon ex-
amination cannot be considered in good faith.1
NOTICE FROM DEE
It is clear that where the occupant takes possession of land under a deed
which shows plainly on its face that he does not have the fee, he cannot
7Combs v. Deaton, 199 Ky. 477, 251 S.W. 638 (1923).
'Beard v. Dansby, 48 Ark. 183, 2 S.W. 701 (1886).
'Brown v. Baldwin, 121 Mo. 106,25 S.W. 858 (1893).
"
0Bragg v. McCoy, 188 Ky. 762, 224 S.W. 200 (1920); Loeb v. Conley, 160 Ky.
91, 169 S.W. 575 (1914); Cleland v. Clark, 123 Mich. 179, 81 N.W. 1086(1900); Petit v. Flint, 119 Mich. 492, 78 N.W. 554 (1899).
'Cleland v. Clark, 123 Mich. 179, 81 N.W. 1086 (1900).
" The cases which hold that persons taking by quit claim deed are not in good faith
apply only to cases arising under the recording laws. See Cleland v. Clark, 123
Mich. 179, 81 N.W. 1086 (1900).
"States following the minority view are: Georgia, Illinois, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
" Clark v. Leavitt, 335 111. 184, 166 N.E. 538 (1929); Anglin v. Pennington, 296
Ky. 142, 176 S.W.2d 277 (1943); Vincent v. Goddard 7 Ohio 188 (1836). (Here
the land had a judgment lien and a land levy on it. It was held that no one could
mistake these facts and the occupant cannot be said to be absolutely free from fraud
and collusion.) Johnson v. Schumacher, 72 Tex. 334, 12 S.W. 207 (1888); Mc-
Donald v. Rothgeb, 112 Va. 749, 72 S.E. 692 (1911); Williamson v. Jones, 43 -
W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411 (1897); Dawson v. Grow 29 W. Va. 333, 1 S.E. 564
(1887).
'Dawson v. Grow, 29 W. Va. 333, 1 S.E. 564 (1887).
' Anderson v. Reid, 14 App. D. C. 54 (1899).
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be in good faith so as to entitle him to compensation for improvements
made.17 Thus, where a deed shows plainly that only a life estate is con-
veyed, the purchaser cannot be in good faith.' 8 The deed apparently must
convey an estate which would justify the occupant thereof in making per-
manent improvements.' 9 Even though the occupant is unaware of a defect
on the face of his title paper, he is nevertheless not in good faith with respect
to improvements because a purchaser of land is conclusively presumed to
know what appears on the face of the deed under which he claims title.20
Where there is some defect with respect to the legal description on the
deed an interesting result has been reached. If there is in fact no legal de-
scription on the deed, the deed is void upon its face and the grantee does not
take in good faith.2 ' If, however, the legal description is merely incom-
plete or erroneous, the grantee will be considered in good faith even though
the deed is actually void upon its face.22 Apparently the complete lack of
any description would be sufficient notice to the reasonable man, so as to
put him on inquiry.23
Ohio has a leading case in this area.2 4 The grantee's title showed on its
face that the land once belonged to X. The deed, prior to the one from
which X took title, expressly showed an adverse claim in a third person.
The supreme court held that the grantee will not be presumed to know re-
citals in deeds prior to the deed to his grantor. If, however, the recital in
the deed to his grantor, or his own deed expressly shows an adverse claim,
then the grantee will be held to have notice. Thus, Ohio holds the grantee
not only to defects in his own deed, but also to any defects in the deed to
his grantor. This view is somewhat stricter than the general rule in most
states, which holds the grantee to defects in his own deed only.
'
1 In Bartholomew v. Rothrock, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 57 (App. 1935), the deed recited
that the land be used "for grain elevator purposes only," and if not so used, it would
revert to the grantor. The grantee could not recover for improvements. The same
result occurred in Wood v. Conrad, 2 S.D. 334, 50 N.W. 95 (1891), where the
deed contained a provision that the lots deeded were subject to a "right of redemp-
tion from a sheriff's sale." This was express notice that title was not absolute.
' Stewart v. Matheny, 66 Miss. 21, 5 So. 387 (1889).
"Beardsley v. Chapman, 1 Ohio St. 118 (1853). Bartholomew v. Rothrock, 21
Ohio L. Abs. 57 (App. 1935); Seibel v. Higham, 216 Mo. 121, 115 S.W. 987
(1889); in Scott v. Battle, 85 N.C. 184 (1881), the husband of the grantor did notjoin in the deed, making it void in law. The grantee was held not to be in good
faith because he is charged by implication of law with knowledge of the invalidity
of his own tide.
'Stewart v. Matheny, 66 Miss. 21, 5 So. 387 (1889).
21Simpson v. Johnson, 44 S.W. 1076 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
"Bassett v. Sherrod, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 327, 35 S.W. 312 (1896).
The reasonable man test was used by the court in Wood v. Conrad, 2 S.D. 334, 50
N.W. 95 (1891).
'Beardsley v. Chapman, 1 Ohio St. 118 (1853).
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MOYcE FROM WILL
There are not many cases considering the question of the good faith of
the grantee when his -title descended to him directly or indirectly by devise.
Where the title passed to the grantee directly by devise, any defect in the
will should probably be construed under the same rules as defects in a deed,
where the land passed by grant. Therefore, if the will shows plainly on its
face that the grantee does not have clear title, he should not be held to be an
occupant in good faith with respect to improvements made. This would
hold true even though the occupant was unaware of the defect2 5 Where,
however, the will is declared void after improvements are made by an occu-
pant in good faith who originally took under the will, he is entitled to
compensation 2 6
When title to the property descends indirectly by devise, the problem is
a different one. This situation arises when the occupant's grantor takes
title by devise. If the deed -to the occupant refers to the will by which the
grantor got title, it has been held that the occupant will be on notice of any
defects in that wil. 2 7 Even where there is no mention of the will in the
deed, a court has held the occupant not to be in good faith where the will
showed a defect. He was on constructive notice of the provisions of the
will, and it was his duty to examine the records.2s
KNOWLEDGE OF TITLE IN ANOTHER
As a general rule, the occupying claimant must believe he owns the fee
simple title to the land in order to be considered in good faith. He will
not be entitled to compensation for improvements made when he thinks he
is a possessor of an interest less than the fee. Thus, where one enters upon
land under a title, but with knowledge that he is obligated to reconvey the
land upon a certain contingency, he will not be allowed compensation when
the contingency eventuatesPm The occupant under such conditions should
reasonably expect that 'his title might be defeated, and therefore he makes
'See note 17, supra.
'Bloom v. Strauss, 70 Ark. 483, 69 S.W. 548 (1902).
' Walker v. Quigg, 6 Watts. 87 (Pa. 1837). Here, occupant took a deed which
referred to the will by which the grantor got tide. Had occupant looked up the will,
he would have seen the defect in his tide. He was held not to have sufficient good
faith to recover for improvements.
'Clark v. Leavitt, 335 IMI. 184, 166 N.E. 538 (1929). It was pointed out in this
case, however, that the occupant will be held to notice of the provisions of the will
by which his grantor took title only if the will is probated in the same county in
which the land is located. Also, Illinois is a jurisdiction which follows the minority
rule with respect to constructive notice from the records. Query, whether the same
result would be reached under the majority rule, which holds the occupant to be in
good faith regardless of the records, where he has no actual notice.
'Rogers v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 25 S.E.2d 167 (1943).
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improvements at the risk of losing them. Furthermore, the mere hope of
someday securing the tide will not be sufficient to give the occupant the
necessary good haith to enable him to receive compensation."0
Under certain circumstances, however, the courts have made exceptions
to the strict rule requiring the occupant to believe he owns the fee in order
to be in good faith. One exception has occurred where the occupant made
improvements at the time when he held possession under an agreement
to purchase. One reason why he was allowed compensation was the fact
that he was justified in entertaining the belief that legal title would ulti-
mately be conveyed to him."'
Another exception has been granted when the occupant improved land
under an agreement with the life tenant that the land would eventually be-
come his.3 2 The occupant in good faith believed the life tenant to be the
owner of the fee. The court required compensation by the remainderman
because the occupant was justified in entertaining the belief that the fee
would be conveyed to him, and therefore, he was in good faith.
Whether or not the occupant is in good faith when he knows that the
fee is in another is demonstrated in cases involving a husband-wife situa-
tion.33 When the wife makes improvements upon land, tide to which she
knows is in her husband, she will be precluded from compensation if the
husband sells the land. This result occurs because the wife cannot be in
good faith when she knows she does not own the fee. Even the hope or
expectation of eventual acquisition of the title will not be sufficient. In
some cases, it is obvious that this rule will work a hardship on the wife.
MISTAKE AS TO BOUNDARY
Where improvements are made on lands actually owned by another, the
general rule allows the improver to recover if the mistake was one which
could not reasonably have been avoided.3 4 This problem usually occurs
when the owner of land mistakenly constructs a building or makes some
other improvement on the land of his neighbor. In other words, the
' Gibson v. Hutchins, 12 La. Ann. 545 (1857). (Occupant denied compensation
because of lack of good faith, where he was a mere settler with the hope of securing
a preemption.)
'Preston v. Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18 (1878). Another reason why compensation
was allowed here under the theory of unjust enrichment was because the true owner
of the legal title stood by and watched the occupant improve the land without warn-
ing him.
Folsom v. Clark, 72 Me. 44 (1881). See also Fee v. Cowdry, 45 Ark. 410 (1885).
'Kelly v. Kelly, 293 Ky. 42, 168 S.W.2d 339 (1943); Bryan v. Councilman, 106
Md. 380, 67 At. 279 (1907).
'Wacker v. Price, 70 Ariz. 99, 216 P.2d 707 (1950); Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga.
422, 141 S.E. 188 (1927); Gregory v. Kedley, 185 So. 105 (La. App. 1938); Fain
v. Nelms, 156 S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
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owner was mistaken as to the true location of the boundary line between
his property and that of his neighbor. The test of whether or not the mis-
take was bona fide seems to be whether the owner acted reasonably in
believing that he owned the land.3 5 If the reasonable man of ordinary pru-
dence likewise would have been misled, then the owner would be in good
faith, and compensation for his improvements would be allowed.
When a house is built partly on a neighbor's property due to an honest
mistake, another factor which will add to the determination of the occu-
pants good faith is the action of the neighbor. If he merely stands by and
permits the improvements knowing of the error, few courts will allow the
neighbor to take over the improvement without compensation 3 6 If the
neighbor makes any positive acts or declarations which in any way influence
the occupant's action, this is further evidence of a reasonable mistake, and
the courts will allow compensation because the occupant was in good faith 37
A problem occurs when the deed by which the occupant claims title
contains a description of a lot other than the one which the occupant in-
tended to buy. This mistake may arise when a large tract is being de-
veloped, and a different sublot is described in the deed than the one in-
tended to be purchased. When the occupant builds a house on the lot he
thought he owned, but in fact did not, his mistake has been considered
reasonable, so that he is held to be in good faith and entitled to recover.38
Other courts appear to be somewhat stricter in their definition of good
faith in the area of mistake as to boundary. A federal court sitting in
Kentucky held that one who mistakenly drilled for oil on the property of
another was not entitled to compensation because he did not exercise the
diligence of a reasonable man in attempting to discover the boundary line.39
It has even been classified as "culpable negligence" for one to construct a
building on another's lot.4 0 The reasonable man would obtain a survey
map and locate the lot thereon the courts have reasoned. But this reason-
'Fain v. Nelms, 156 S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), where the court applied
this test and allowed recovery where there was a mistake in a survey.
'Stewart v. Matheny, 66 Miss. 21, 5 So. 387 (1889); Preston v. Brown, 35 Ohio
St. 18 (1878).
'Karpik v. Robinson, 171 Minn. 318, 214 N.W. 59 (1927). Furthermore in Wal-
ton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 141 SE. 188 (1927), the court allowed full compensation
to one who completed construction of a building after he had been warned by the
owner that he was building over his line. The reason for full compensation was
that the completion was necessary in order to preserve and make useful and valuable
the building.
'Gregory v. Kedley, 185 So. 105 (La. App. 1938).
'Kentucky Electric Power Co. v. Norton Coal Mining Co., 93 F.2d 923 (6th Cir.
1938).
'O Camden, Atlantic & Venmor Land Co. v. Mason, 91 N.J. Eq. 25, 108 Ad. 778
(1919).
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ing seems to be beyond the spirit of good faith within the meaning of the
betterment statutes.
In other cases involving mistakes as to boundary lines the courts refuse
compensation on the ground of bad faith in not employing a surveyor to
ascertain the correct line before construction begins. One court has said:
If he [the occupying claimant] failed to employ the legal means of in-
formation as to his limits, and intruded upon the land of another, he must
pay the penalty of his own folly.'
Where, however, the surveyor has made a mistake in the survey, the
courts allow compensation,42 unless the true owner of the neighboring land
has warned the occupant of the error before construction.43 The reason for
allowing compensation to an occupant who relied on a mistaken survey, is
that he was probably justified in relying on the reputation, trustworthiness
and competency of an experienced survey or surveyor.44
KowLEDGE OF OWN TITLE DEFEcr
An occupying claimant who improves land with knowledge that he
does not own the fee simple title is not usually entitled to compensation be-
cause he is in bad faith.4 5 The test used by the courts is whether or not
the occupant improved the land under the honest belief he owned the
fee.4 6 He is also required to have based this honest belief on reasonable
grounds. 47 So that when one enters land under a title knowing of an
obligation to reconvey the land upon a certain contingency, he will not
be entitled to compensation for improvements because he had no reasonable
grounds for an honest belief in the validity of his title. A reasonable man
would not have improved under such circumstances.
There is no doubt that if the occupant knows he has only a life estate,
he cannot recover compensation for improvements because this relief is
only given to those honestly believing they own the fee4 Even when the
occupant purchased the land originally believing he had the fee, but later
learned of a defect in his title through conversations with others, he cannot
" Sartain v. Hamilton, 12 Tex. 219, 223 (1854).
'Wacker v. Price, 70 Ariz. 99, 216 P.2d 707 (1950).
"Foltz v. Alford, 102 Ark. 191, 143 S.W. 905 (1912).
"Fain v. Nelms, 156 S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
'Beard v. Dansby, 48 Ark. 183, 2 S.W. 701 (1886); Warwick v. Harvey, 158 Md.
457, 148 Ad. 592 (1930).
'Rogers v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 25 S.E.2d 167 (1943); Smith v. Vankirk, 76
N.E.2d 924 (Ohio App. 1945).
Rogers v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 25 S.E.2d 167 (1943).
"Graves v. Bean, 200 Ark. 863, 141 S.W.2d 50 (1940).
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recover.49 The test is whether or not the occupant knew of the defect at
the time the improvements were made.
The occupant will likewise be denied compensation where he improves
land, the title to which he knows is in dispute.50 He will not have the re-
quisite good faith if he knows this fact, even if he, in good faith, believes
his title is superior. He must be wholly ignorant of a title dispute.
If the occupying claimant claims title only by an oral agreement, in
which there was no written contract or deed running to him, he will not be
in good faith.51 The same rule is applied when the contract is written, but
is only executory.5 2 Furthermore, there can be no good faith if one of the
principals claiming title as the occupying claimant was also a principal of
the seller. This situation occured in an interesting Michigan case0 3 X was
the largest stockholder of an insolvent bank, which made a voidable sale of
property to K Company. X was also a trustee and held stock as such in the
K Company. The Company made improvements on the property, but
could not recover compensation therefor because it reasonably should
have known of the defect in title through M
When the occupant is actually a tenant in common with others, but
thinks he holds the entire fee, he is usually held to be in good faith and en-
titled to compensation because he was acting under an honest belief that
he held the fee.54 But, if the occupant knows of his tenancy in common,55
or knows facts from which he should suspect such a tide,56 he will not be
in good faith.
KNOWLEDGE OF ANOTHER'S CLAIM
The general rule is that when the occupant is aware of the true character
of his tide, and that tide is not in him, he will not be acting in good faith in
"Williams v. Beckmark, 150 Neb. 100, 33 N.W.2d 352 (1948); Smith v. Van-
kirk, 76 N.E.2d 924 (Ohio App. 1945). (Occupying claimant could not collect
for improvements made after he had learned of his title defect through conversations
with his mother.)
Etherington v. Bailiff, 334 Mich. 543, 55 N.W.2d 86 (1952).
"Truslow v. Ball, 166 Va. 608, 186 S.E. 71 (1936).
"Hollis v. Smith, 64 Tex. 280 (1885). But see Preston v. Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18
(1878), in which compensation was allowed because the occupant was justified in
the belief that legal title would ultimately be conveyed to him.
" Schultz v. Kalamazoo Improvement Co., 284 Mich. 305, 279 N.W. 521 (1938).
"Youmans v. Youmans, 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1924); Johnson v. Pelot, 24
S.C. 255 (1885); Buck v. Martin, 21 S.C. 590 (1884).
' Youmans v. Youmans, 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1924); Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts.
238 (Pa. 1834); In Taylor v. Foster, 22 Ohio St. 255 (1871), the occupant was not
in good faith because he had knowledge of his tenancy in common, even knowing
of an express contingency that the entire fee would pass to him if the other tenant
died without issue.
'Wheeler v. Wannamaker, 24 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 101 (Putnam Com. Pl 1921).
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making improvements thereafter.5"7 Compensation will not be awarded to
him in such a situation, even if the true owner stands by and watches the
improving.58 If the occupant is advised of the consequences of making
improvements, together with his knowledge of the tide, a stronger case
will be made out against him.5 9
Compensation, however, is not denied in all cases where the occupant
has knowledge of another claiming tide.60 If the occupant is cognizant
of the claim of another, he may nevertheless be in good faith if he has rea-
sonable and strong grounds to believe that his tide is sounder.61 This situa-
tion usually arises where the occupant hears of another's claim, but believes
his own claim superior. He has likely made an innocent mistake in law in
construing his own tide. It has been reasoned that it would be going too
far to charge the occupant with the consequence of not properly under-
standing the nature of his tide, or the character of the evidence by which it
might be sustained. 62
The mere fact that the occupant hears that another is claiming tide to
the property will not prohibit him from being in good faith. This is
especially true if the alleged claimant takes no steps to assert his right,- or
if the improvements are considered as repairs. 64
When a railroad makes improvements on land of another, and there-
after proceeds to appropriate it under the power of eminent doman, it will
nevertheless be required to pay the owner the value of the land with the
improvements.65
'Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447 (1882); Barlow v. Bell, 1 A.K. Marsh. 246
(Ky. 1818). This rule also applies where the occupant is a lessee, and he has knowl-
edge of a prior valid lease to others. See Cobbett v. Gallagher, 339 Pa. 231, 13
A.2d 403 (1940).
' Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447 (1882).
'Barlow v. Bell, 1 A.K. Marsh. 246 (Ky. 1818).
' An early Kentucky case held the good faith factor was required only when
the occupying claimant was himself the plaintiff, so that where lands were improved
by one having notice of a prior equity, he was nevertheless allowed compensation in
a suit by the true owner. See Pugh v. Bell, 2 T.B. Mon. 126 (Ky. 1825).
' Sartain v. Hamilton, 12 Tex. 219 (1854).
'Harrison v. Castner, 11 Ohio St. 339 (1860).
'Griffiths v. Ogle, 6 Tenn. App. 695 (1928). Mere knowledge of another's claim
of title to land "in the vicinity" was not sufficient to put occupant on notice in Greet
v. Vaughn, 96 Ark. 524, 132 S.W. 456 (1910).
"In Jackson v. Ludeling, 99 U.S. 513 (1878), occupant bought a dilapidated rail-
road under circumstances that would show him to be in bad faith. He was entitled
to recover for improvements he made thereon, however, because the nature of the
improvements was so similar to repairs.
'Graham v. Connersville and New Castle Junction Ry. Co., 36 Ind. 463 (1871).
(Slimmer
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KNowmGE FROm PENDING LITIGATON AND
FINAL JUDICIAL DECREES
Where the occupant has knowledge of pending litigation involving
the tide to the property which he occupies, he will not be in good faith re-
garding improvements.66 And this rule applies, whether or not the law-
suit was pending at the time the occupant went into possession under color
of tide.67 Furthermore, the courts are not concerned with whether or not
the occupant himself is a party to the litigation. It is enough if he has
knowledge of the litigation before improvements are made, to hold him in
legal bad faith. Any other rule would be inequitable with respect to the
true owner, because he might be improved out of his right and title to the
property.68
The type of lawsuit pending is not significant either. The strict rule of
no compensation because of the lack of good faith has been applied to
actions in partition6 9 and ejectment.J0 Even in a situation where the occu-
pant purchased property from an heir, pending final administration of the
estate from which the property passed, he was not entitled to compensa-
tion as against a later purchaser of the legal title at an administrator's sale.
When improvements are made during the pendency of an appeal from
a judgment, the rule is followed religiously once again. It does not appear
inequitable to refuse compensation to the occupant for whom judgment
went adversely in the lower court, because he should have good reason to
believe his tide unsound. The courts have so held. 1 But, where judgment
was awarded in favor of the occupant, reason would deduce that the rule
might break down.72 The lawsuit is technically still pending, and there-
fore an occupant should not be permitted to improve without the risk of the
judgment's being reversed and no compensation being allowed.
When the occupant has notice of a final judicial decree in his favor,
he may rely on that, and improvements he makes thereafter will be in good
faith, so that he may recover compensation therefor. This problem might
arise where the occupant has purchased the property at a judicial sale.
'Brandon v. Stone, 162 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. App. 1942); Cobbett v. Gallagher, 339
Pa. 231, 13 A.2d 403 1940).
" In Scott v. Molter, 149 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), the court said that
one purchasing land knowing of a lawsuit pending in regard to such land, was actual-
ly purchasing a lawsuit He cannot be in good faith with respect to improvement
until final determination that title is good in him.
aCobbett v. Gallagher, 339 Pa. 231, 13 A.2d 403 (1940).
Youmans v. Youmans, 128 S.C. 31, 121 S.E. 674 (1924).
First Nat. Bank Bldg. Co. v. Riddle, 77 Okla. 143, 187 Pac. 479 (1920).
'iNorton v. Davis, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 90, 35 S.W. 181 (1896).
"Taylor v. Belcher Loan and Mortgage Co. 265 S.W. 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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Ordinarily great confidence is placed by the public in such a sale, in the
belief that the purchaser is getting a good title.73 If the judgment on which
the judicial sale is based is later reversed, voiding title in the purchaser, he
will nevertheless have the requisite good faith and be entitled to compensa-
tion for improvements made in the interim.7 4 However, where improve-
ments are made after a foreclosure decree is entered against the occupant,
he will not be in good faith even where he sincerely thought that the decree
was invalid.75
An occupant under title is justified in relying on a judgment which de-
clared a title in another to be void. If the decision is later reversed, and the
occupant put out of possession, he may recover compensation, for he was
justified in relying on a judicial decree, not pending appeal at the time.7
An occupant is even justified in relying on a judge's off-hand opinion as to
his right to make improvements. 77
There is a problem involving lis pendens. If the occupant purchases
property on which there is pending litigation unknown to him, but recorded
under provisions of lis pendens, he should nevertheless be in good faith.78
This view would follow the reasoning of the majority view in the record-
ing cases, discussed previously.79 The test of actual notice, if applied, would
find the occupant in good faith, as would the test of whether or not he had
an honest belief that his title was clear.
CONCLUSION
It is readily apparent that good faith must be determined in most situa-
tions from a complete understanding of the facts of each case. One
requisite, however, applicable in all cases, is that the occupant must be under
an honest belief that he owns the legal title. And this belief usually must
be founded upon such reasonable grounds as would lead a man of ordinary
prudence to entertain it. Thus, the term good faith is not used in the
technical sense as applied to conveyances.
Actual notice of a title defect is required in most jurisdictions before
compensation will be denied. This may include notice from obvious de-
"McDonald v. Rankin, 92 Ark. 173, 122 S.W. 88 (1909).
"Kidd v. Roundtree, 285 Ky. 442, 148 S.W.2d 275 (1941).
'Anderson v. Connolly, 310 Mass. 5, 36 N.E.2d 404 (1941).
' 'Gaither v. Haarick, 69 Tex. 92, 6 S.W. 619 (1887).
'Rowe v. Arnett, 241 Ky. 768, 45 S.W.2d 12 (1931).
"'McDonald v. Rankin, 92 Ark. 173, 122 S.W. 88 (1909), so holds. The reasoning
was based on the fact that both the Betterment Act and the doctrine of lis pendens
were founded upon public policy but that the act should control because the legisla-
tive will should not be submerged by a common law doctrine. But see, Eppenauer v.
Ohio Oil Co., 128 F.2d 363 (1942), which is contra.
" See notes 3 to 12, supra.
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